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Voice of Evidence 
What’s the Evidence for Lean? 
Tore Dybå, Helen Sharp 
 
The question of what empirical evidence is, how it is interpreted, and how useful it is for 
different contexts, are questions of constant importance for software managers and practitioners 
who are faced with technology adoption decisions (Dybå et al., 2005). Independent of such 
evidence, however, we cannot expect a technology to be universally good or universally bad, only 
more (or less) appropriate in some circumstances and for some organizations. 
 
Yet, in The Machine that Changed the World, Womack et al. (1990) purported that lean production is 
the one best way to manufacture cars and everything else: “lean production is a superior way for 
humans to make things,” so “it is in everyone’s interest to introduce lean production everywhere 
as soon as possible.”  
 
Given what we just said about the appropriateness of new technologies, these are quite bold 
claims, and the question is: what’s the evidence to back them up? Also, because lean is one of the 
software development trends that has attracted a lot of attention lately, it is interesting to take a 
closer look at the original evidence behind lean.  
 
We will not go into, nor make any claims directly related to lean software development itself, 
neither will we go into the literature that criticizes the appropriateness or social consequences of 
lean. We will only take a glimpse behind the curtains at the evidence behind the original concept 
of lean production, and its popular interpretation, as an example of the inherent challenges of 
measuring and interpreting evidence for performance differences.  
 
Basically, it all narrows down to the interpretation of the results from the largest international 
productivity survey in the history of the car industry: the MIT’s International Motor Vehicle 
Program (IMVP) survey carried out in the late 1980s (Krafcik, 1988; Womack et al., 1990) to 
compare productivity across car assembly plants. The IMVP survey was a study of car assembler 
productivity based on the general ratio between inputs and outputs. In this case, between labor 
hours and number of cars built.  
 
Due, in a large part, to the The Machine that Changed the World, the bottom line measures of the 
IMVP survey have received a lot of attention; like the claimed 2:1 ratio between the best Japanese 
productivity and worst American performers, and the claim that it had been conclusively 
demonstrated that lean production had lowered the labor hours to build cars at any level of 
factory automation. However, the technicalities of calculations and interpretations leading up to 
these measures have not received the same attention.  
 
In the following, we will examine the empirical evidence and its interpretation from the IMVP 
survey, its relation to lean production, and what we can learn from it. This discussion is based on 
Coffey’s (2006) excellent analysis in The Myth of Japanese Efficiency. While doing so, we want to 
emphasize that we differentiate between the outstanding survey itself (Krafcik, 1988) and the 
popular account and interpretation of it given by Womack et al. in The Machine that Changed the 
World. Like Coffey, our main points are that i) the survey is worth taking seriously, but ii) that it is 
open to quite different interpretations from those which are generally accepted.  
 
General issues of the IMVP survey design 
The IMVP survey only deals with measurements taken in the later stages of car production in the 
assembly plant, which typically involve welding, painting, engine assembly, trim, and final 
assembly. Womack et al. justify this selection highlighting that the goal of the IMVP survey was 
to compare assembly plants, and that assembly plants are highly comparable. As Coffey points 
out, given the claims of a ‘lean’ revolution, this last aspect is rather astonishing since any radical 
variances in plant layout or organization are discounted from the outset of the survey when 
accounting for differences in the resources used to build cars: 
 
[A]ssembly plants all over the world do almost exactly the same things, because practically all 
of today’s cars and light trucks are built with very similar fabrication techniques. (Womack et 
al., p. 76). 
 
Several commentators have criticized the IMVP survey’s productivity measurement based on the 
way it constructs a corrected bottom line through cumulative adjustments of, e.g., direct and 
indirect workers, standard activities, standard working times, and average cars, using a number of 
complex indices (e.g. Williams et al., 1994). However, it’s easy to get lost in the complexities of 
both these criticisms and the IMVP methodology itself, and lose sight of the larger picture. We 
will therefore only look at two major issues highlighted by Coffey: the way in which labor hours 
are measured, and the estimated levels of assembly plant automation. 
 
Labor hours and automation 
The bottom line productivity measure of the IMVP survey is the number of labor hours used to 
build a car. The first major issue that Coffey highlights, is an important overlooked point of the 
IMVP survey - that no allowance was made for work carried out in excess of a single standard 
shift, i.e., all overtime was ignored and only a simple headcount of workers was included. 
Nevertheless, the estimated hours of labor input based on the single shift was divided by a daily 
output of cars. To see why this is a major issue when comparing input-output relationships across 
manufacturing sites in the automobile industry, let’s take a closer look at Coffey’s example. Let’s 
assume a plant in which there are 1,500 available workers that perform a single shift of 8 hours 
with no overtime. Suppose that the daily output is 400 cars assembled. The basic productivity 
measure in this example would then be (8 x 1,500)/400 = 30 hours per car. 
 
Let’s change the assumptions and look at a similar plant with a different configuration of shift 
work and overtime. Now, let’s assume that there is overtime and that all workers currently 
perform a double shift. Suppose for simplicity that the headcount of available workers at this 
plant is 750 with the same daily output of 400 cars assembled. An accurate assessment of plant 
productivity in this example would then be the same as in the previous example: (16 x 750)/400 
= 30 hours per car. But, if no allowance is made for double-shift working, and we assume that all 
workers in the headcount only work a single shift, this halves to give (8 x 750)/400 = 15 hours 
per car.  
 
Any survey that multiplies an employment total by the hours worked in a single non-overtime 
shift, to get an estimate of labor input to production, is in great danger of introducing systematic 
bias. Because the car industry is an industry characterized by both complex shift patterns and the 
use of overtime, this casts serious doubts on the interpretations of the IMVP survey findings 
presented in The Machine that Changed the World. And, especially so since available data shows, e.g., 
a more than ten hours’ difference in the average working week in Japan versus Europe, and since 
Japanese manufacturers at the time of the IMVP survey were known for ‘massive amounts of 
overtime’. 
 
The second major issue that Coffey points out is the interpretation of the relationship between 
assembly plant hours used to build a car, and differences in the estimated levels of assembly plant 
automation. The data obtained by the IMVP survey indicated that assembly plants in Japan were 
highly automated compared to plants in other regions covered by the survey. Even the least 
automated of the Japanese assembly plants surveyed still achieved a very high score on 
automation compared to most other car assembly plants in the world. 
 
All else being equal, this would clearly suggest that automation played a very important role in 
accounting for Japan’s typically low score on the labor hours used per car in the IMVP survey, 
vis-à-vis assembly plants elsewhere in the world. Indeed, in their analyses, Womack et al. found 
that variation in the levels of plant automation seemed to account for about one-third of the total 
variation in the hours used to build cars, as measured by linear regression. However, automation 
was downplayed as a major determining factor, and the IMVP survey findings were accordingly 
interpreted in terms of a simple comparison between average hours used to assemble a car 
 
According to the IMVP survey, car assembly plants in Europe seemed to perform differently 
from similarly automated plants in the rest of the world. Due to this fact, Coffey shows how it 
would have been possible to draw quite different inferences from the same set of data: “Indeed, 
if the data for Europe had been taken separately, ‘evidence’ of a lean revolution would have been 
much harder to find” because plants in Japan would have been distinguished from plants in other 
regions of the world first and foremost on the basis of automation. 
 
After making allowance for the possible distorting effects of Europe, Coffey’s reanalysis shows 
that automation would now have accounted for around three-quarters of the sampled variation. 
By most standards this would be characterized as a very large effect size, which is why Coffey 
concludes that, for plants outside Europe, evidence of organizational superiority (or lean 
production), as opposed to high automation, would have been very hard to come by. 
 
Assessment and interpretation 
From the viewpoint of reinterpreting the IMVP survey findings, therefore, there are two different 
issues. Coffey showed us that a reasonable case can be made that Japanese car assembly plants 
looked globally exceptional at the level of site automation, but less so at the level of differences in 
labor input not ascribable to automation. But more importantly, the detail provided by Krafcik 
on the design of the survey points to the possibility of a systemic bias in the labor input measure, 
one, which Coffey points out, might just as reasonably have been expected to influence results 
both by plants and by regions. 
 
Taking the collated evidence seriously, and giving due credit to the survey architects, Coffey 
reaches a quite contrary set of conclusions, stating that: 
 
First we dispute that evidence was ever presented to indicate that Japanese car assemblers 
possessed a discernible organizational advantage over Western competitors once due 
allowance was made for differences in measured levels of assembly plant automation. Second, 
we show that the data in question was biased … on this basis, we suggest a prima facie case 
for considering whether correcting for this bias would in fact suggest that Japanese assemblers 
were at this point in time struggling to convert worker effort into finished cars, vis-à-vis 
Western competitors. … 
 
On the basis of the findings from the IMVP survey Coffey thus concludes that Womack et al. 
may have given an account of the ability of an assembler to convert hours of effort into finished 
goods that is flawed and a more plausible interpretation is that bias in the measurement of 
productivity, and level of site automation better explains the results. 
 
So, what can we learn from this? Hopefully, we have shown that evidence isn’t always what it 
seems to be and that popular interpretations aren’t necessarily the only ones (or even the most 
accurate ones). It is necessary, therefore, to go behind the bottom line measures to challenge their 
assumptions, their standardized models, and their use and adjustments of inputs and outputs. 
Only then can we make sense of the evidence behind a claim and its wider applicability. 
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